NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corporation of America: A  Narrow  Decision? by Hays, Kathryn L.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 55 | Number 5
May 1995
NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corporation of
America: A "Narrow" Decision?
Kathryn L. Hays
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Kathryn L. Hays, NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corporation of America: A "Narrow" Decision?, 55 La. L. Rev. (1995)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol55/iss5/6
NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corporation of America:
A "Narrow" Decision?
I. FACTS
The National Labor Relations Board (the Board) alleged the owner of the
Heartland Nursing Home violated the National Labor Relations Act (the Act)'
by disciplining and terminating licensed practical nurses (LPN).2 The General
Counsel' of the Board alleged that Heartland disciplined several nurses, and
eventually terminated three, because the nurses engaged in protected activities.4
The nurses in question initiated a meeting with officials at the headquarters of
the nursing home to discuss perceived problems at the facility.5 As a result of
the meeting, an investigation was launched by the director of human resources.
Copyright 1995, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988).
2. In Louisiana, the "practice of practical nursing" is defined as:
[Tihe performance for compensation of any acts, not requiring the education, training and
preparation required in professional nursing, in the care, treatment or observation of the
ill, injured or infirm and for the maintenance of the health of others and the promotion
of health care, including the administration of medications and treatments or in on job
training or supervising licensed practical nurses, subordinate personnel or instructing
patients consistent with the licensed practical nurse's education and preparation, under the
direction of a licensed physician or dentist acting individually or in his capacity as a
member of the medical staff, or registered nurse. The licensed practical nurse may
perform any of the foregoing duties, and with appropriate training may perform additional
specified acts which are authorized -by the Board of Practical Nurse Examiners when
directed to do so by the licensed physician or dentist acting individually or in his capacity
as a member of the medical staff, or registered nurse.
La. R.S. 37:961 (1988). Although the nurses at issue here were employed in Ohio, the Louisiana
definition of practical nursing is illustrative of the requirements and duties of LPNs.
3. The General Counsel of the Board exercises general supervision over the attorneys
employed by the Board. The General Counsel has final authority, on behalf of the Board, in respect
of the investigation of charges, the issuance of complaints, and the prosecution of such complaints
before the Board. 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1988).
4. The Act provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and
to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section
158(a)(3) of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988). An unfair labor practice is established if the employer interferes with,
restrains, or coerces employees in the exercise of the rights enumerated in Section 157. 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(1) (1988).
5. The problems included what some employees thought were the employer's disparate
enforcement of its absentee policy, short staffing, low wages for nurses' aides, increasing the nurses'
paperwork, and management's failure to communicate with employees. Health Care & Retirement
Corp. of Am., 306 N.L.R.B. 63 (1992).
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The investigation culminated in the termination of the nurses who initiated the
investigation. The discharged nurses filed a complaint with the Board alleging
unfair labor practices. The General Counsel issued a complaint. The nursing
home owner answered by denying he had violated the Act and by alleging the
nurses were "supervisors," not afforded the protection of the Act.6 The nurses
were usually the senior ranking employees on duty at the nursing home. Their
duties included ensuring adequate staffing, making daily work assignments,
monitoring and evaluating the work of nurses' aides, and reporting to manage-
ment.7 In the hearing on the unfair labor practice,8 the administrative law judge
(AJ) held the nurses were not supervisors because the nurses' direction of other
employees focused on the health care of the patients and not on the business of
the employer.9 The National Labor Relations Board affirmed the finding of the
AL. 0 The Sixth Circuit, however, reversed and held that the Board's test for
determining the supervisory status of nurses was inconsistent with the Act."
The Supreme Court granted writs and affirmed the Sixth Circuit.' 2 HELD:
The National Labor Relations Board's test for determining the supervisory status
of nurses in the health care profession is inconsistent with the wording and the
legislative intent of the National Labor Relations Act. The Board created a
"false dichotomy" that distinguished between acts taken "in connection with
patient care" and acts taken "in the interest of the employer."' 3 The "patient
care analysis" used by the Board was inconsistent with the statutory definition
of supervisor and may no longer be utilized to classify nurses as supervisors or
employees."
The impact of this decision will be felt immediately in the health care
profession. Employers may withdraw recognition from unions representing
licensed practical nurses, and new units including licensed practical nurses will
not be recognized as appropriate bargaining units. Nurses who have operated
under the assumption that their activities are protected by the Act may now find
themselves left without recourse to the' Board if they are terminated or
6. Id.
7. Id. at 69.
8. Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair labor practice, the charge
is investigated by an agent of the Board from the regional office. If the regional investigation
indicates the charge is meritorious, the Board issues a formal complaint and orders the individual to
appear for a hearing. If the charges are established at the hearing before an administrative law judge,
the Board will issue an order requiring such person to cease and desist from any unfair labor practice.
The Board may also order other types of relief, such as reinstatement and backpay. The Board or
any person affected by an order of the Board may obtain review of such order in the appropriate
United States Court of Appeals. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1988).
9. 306 N.L.R.B. at 63.
10. Id.
11. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am. v. NLRB, 987 F.2d 1256 (6th Cir. 1993).
12. NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am., 114 S. C1. 1778 (1994).
13. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1988)).
14. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am., 114 S. Ct. at 1785.
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disciplined because of their protected activities. Additionally, this decision may
have an even greater impact outside of the health care profession. This decision
could easily be expanded and applied to any hierarchically organized workplace
to exclude from coverage employees who direct the work of other employees.
The ultimate result of this decision may be the exclusion of thousands of
employees, previously thought to be protected, from the coverage of the Act.
I. PRIOR LAW
The National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) 5 was enacted by Congress
to ensure that employees were guaranteed the right to organize, to bargain
collectively, and to engage in strikes, picketing, and other concerted activities.1 6
Congress simultaneously created the National Labor Relations Board to interpret
and administer the provisions of the Act. The Act established the Board's
jurisdiction over all labor disputes affecting commerce.' In resolving these
disputes, the Board may either act by adjudicatory proceedings or by promulgat-
ing rules.' The rights guaranteed by the Act were established to create a
balance in bargaining power between an employer and the collective strength of
employees. These rights are not, however, guaranteed to everyone. The Act
only applies to individuals who are included in the definition of "employee"
under the Act.' 9 In general, any person who works for an employer is an
"employee," unless specifically exempted by the Act or by a decision of the
Board. The Act expressly excludes supervisors from the definition of employ-
ee.
20
15. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Star. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169
(1988)).
16, Patrick Hardin, The Developing Labor Law 28 (1992).
17. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1988).
18. 29 U.S.C. §§ 156, 160 (1988).
19. An "employee" includes:
any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless
this subchapter explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any individual whose work
has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or
because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and
substantially equivalent employment, but shall not include any individual employed as an
agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any
individual employed by this patient or spouse, or any individual having the status of an
independent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor, or any individual
employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act as amended from time to
time, or by any other person who is not an employer as herein defined.
29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1988) (emphasis added).
20. Id. The statutory exclusion of supervisors does not prohibit supervisors from organizing.
The exclusion does mean, however, that an employer is not required either to recognize supervisors'
collective bargaining representative or to bargain with the supervisors. Moreover, supervisors are not
protected against any unfair labor practices of the employer.
1995]
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"Supervisor" is defined broadly in the Act as:
any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire,
transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or
discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust
their grievances, or effectively to'recommend such action, if in
connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of
a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent
judgment.2
For an employee to be considered a supervisor under the Act, the individual
in question must exercise independent judgment with respect to the enumerated
factors.22 The statutory factors must be read in the disjunctive; therefore,
possession of any one of the statutory factors is sufficient to confer supervisory
23status. This authority must, however, be exercised in the interest of the
employer. 4
The actual duties of the employee, and not job title, or job classification,
determine supervisory status.' An employee may supervise other employees
without becoming a supervisor for purposes of the Act, if the employee is a
professional acting in accordance with professional norms.2 An employee who
issues routine or minor orders or instructions will not be considered a supervisor
under the Act.27 In borderline cases, the courts and the Board may consider
'other factors to determine supervisory status. 28  Courts have used these
principles to determine the supervisory status of employees. - The continuing
21. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1988).
22. NLRB v. Hale Container Line, Inc., 943 F.2d 394, 396-97 (4th Cir. 1991) ("An individual
qualifies as a supervisor if he maintains any of the preceding responsibilities and exercises his
authority with 'independent judgment' and not merely in a 'routine manner."').
23. NLRB v. KDFW-TV, Inc., 790 F.2d 1273, 1277 (5th Cir. 1986) ("Section 2(11) is to be
read in the disjunctive, with the existence of any one of the statutory powers sufficient to confer
supervisory status.").
24. Northcrest Nursing Home, 313 N.L.R.B.491. 493 (1993) ("If an individual independently
exercises supervisory authority, the Board must then determine if that authority is exercised 'in the
interest of the employer."').
25. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, AFL-CIO v. Davis, 476 U.S. 380, 396 n.13, 106 S.
Ct. 1906, 1915 n.13 (1986) ("Whether a particular employee is a supervisor under the Act depends
on his or her actual duties, not on his or her title or job classification.").
26. Children's Habilitation Center, Inc. v. NLRB, 887 F.2d 130, 131 (7th Cir. 1989) ("[Tlhe
word 'supervisor' in the Act is a term of art, since the statutory definition ... allows an employee
to do some supervision without. thereby becoming a supervisor under the Act. This frequently
happens when the employee is a professional acting in accordance with professional norms.").
27. NLRB v. Yuba Natural Resources, Inc., 824 F.2d 706, 709 (9th Cir. 1987) ("An employee
who only gives minor or routine orders will not be considered a supervisor.").
28. These factors include whether the employee: (I) is considered by other employees and by
himself to be a supervisor; (2) attends management meetings- (3) receives a higher wage than his
fellow employees; and (4) has substantially different benefits from his fellow employees. Hardin,
supra note 16, at 1611-12.
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validity of these principles has, however, been called into question by the
Supreme Court's decision in.Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America.
While the Act expressly excludes supervisors from its coverage, the Act
expressly includes professional employees within its coverage."' The term
professional employee, was intended to refer to "such persons as legal,
engineering, scientific and medical personnel together with their junior
professional assistants."" Some tension has arisen from the inclusion of
professionals and the exclusion of supervisors. This tension has arisen primarily
because much professional work includes and mandates functions which would
otherwise be viewed as supervisory under the Act.3' The Board has repeatedly
held that a professional employee may be excluded from the Act if he fits the
definition of supervisor. 32  Both the courts and the Board have struggled to
resolve the tension created by the "two overlapping directives. 33
In implementing the statutory definition of supervisor, the Board and the
courts created secondary tests (beyond the statutory indicia) to determine
supervisory status.' One of these tests was the "patient care analysis." This
test was used in cases involving members of the health care profession.35 In
implementing this test, the courts and the Board drew a distinction between acts
taken in the interest of the employer and acts taken in the interest of patient care.
According to this test, if an employee exercised supervisory authority to facilitate
care for a patient, the employee was not a supervisor. 6 This test was used to
29. The term "professional employee" means:
(a) any employee engaged in work (i) predominantly intellectual and varied in character
as opposed to routine mental, manual, mechanical, or physical work; (ii) involving the
consistent exercise of discretion and judgment in its performance; (iii) of such a character
that the output produced or the result accomplished cannot be standardized in relation to
a given period of time; (iv) requiring knowledge of an advanced type in a field of science
or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual
instruction and study in an institution of higher learning or a hospital, as distinguished
from a general academic education or from an apprenticeship or from training in the
performance of routine mental, manual, or physical processes; or (b) any employee, who
(i) has completed the courses of specialized intellectual instruction and study described
in clause (iv) of paragraph (a), and (ii) is performing related work under the supervision
of a professional person to qualify himself to become a professional employee as defined
in paragraph (a)
29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (1988).
30. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 94 S. Ct. 1757 (1974).
31. Matthew W. Finkin, The Supervisory Status of Professional Employees, 45 Fordham L. Rev.
805 (1977).
32. University of Vermont, 223 N.L.R.B. 423 (1976); Presbyterian Medical Ctr., 218 N.L.R.B.
1266 (1975).
33. Finkin, supra note 31, at 805.
34. E.g., Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. at 267. 94 S. Ct. at 1757; NLRB v. Berger Transfer &
Storage Co., 678 F.2d 679 (7th Cir. 1982); Anamag & Elec. Workers, 284 N.L.R.B. 621 (1987).
35. See Centralia Convalescent Ctr.. 295 N.L.R.B. 42 (1989); Waverly.Cedar Falls Health Care,
297 N.L.R.B. 390 (1989); NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc., 705 F.2d 1461 (7th Cir. 1983).
36. Northcrest Nursing Home, 313 N.L.R.B. 491. 493 (1993).
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ensure that only employees with real authority would be excluded from coverage
under the Act.
A. Legislative History
The National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act)" was passed by Congress
in 1935. From 1935 until 1947, labor unions flourished with the aid and
encouragement of the federal government.3" In 1935, less than three million
employees belonged to unions; in 1947, almost fifteen million employees were
members.3 9 By 1947, labor unions had achieved great power in the industrial-
ized sector. Both Congress and the general public were concerned about this
increasing power. The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (the Taft-
Hartley Act) was brought about primarily as a response to the important position
unions had assumed in the workplace.4°  The Taft-Hartley Act was also a
response to public fear that unions were growing too powerful. Many believed
Congress needed to halt abuses of power by organized labor.4'
The 1947 amendments to the Act were an attempt, by Congress, to equalize
power in the workplace. The goal was to create a balance of power between
management and labor unions. One component of this goal was to exclude
supervisors from the Act's definition of employee. The Act of 1935 did not
exclude supervisors from its coverage. Prior to 1947, the Board recognized
bargaining units composed entirely of supervisors, and employers were required
to bargain with them.42 Additionally, if an employer took action against a
supervisor for engaging in these activities, the supervisor could file charges of
an unfair labor practice against the employer and would be afforded the full
protection of the Act. Prior to 1947, the Board did exclude, although not
required to do so by the Act, personnel with supervisory duties from bargaining
units that included their subordinates. 3
The Supreme Court, in Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 4 upheld the
Board's decision to allow supervisory personnel to organize. The Court refused
to establish an exception that would deny the coverage of the Act to supervisors,
37. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169
(1988)).
38. Archibald Cox et al., Cases and Materials on Labor Law 92-97 (1991).
39. Id. at 92.
40. Id. at 94.
41. Id. at 94.
42. Hardin, supra note 16, at 1609.
43. Id. at 1608-09.
44. Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 67 S. Ct. 789 (1947), involved a
bargaining unit comprised of foremen. The foremen were responsible for maintaining the quality of
production and initiating recommendations for promotion, demotion, and discipline of employees
under their purview. The Court held that the Act "leaves no room for a construction of this section
to deny the organizational privilege to employees because they act in the interest of an employer.
Every employee ... is required to act in [the employer's) interest." Id. at 488. 67 S. Ct. at 791-92.
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stating "it is for Congress, not for us, to create exceptions or qualifications at
odds with [the Act's] plain terms., 45 Congress did create such an exception
with the Taft-Hartley amendments by excluding supervisors from the definition
of "employee."46 The Board was stripped of the authority to include supervi-
sors in bargaining units or to establish units composed entirely of supervisory
personnel. In addition to defining and excluding supervisors from the Act's
coverage, the Taft-Hartley Act expressly excluded non-profit hospitals from the
coverage of the Act.4
The exclusion of supervisors was controversial and one of the most
important changes made by the 1947 amendments. 48 Congress, in amending the
Act, attempted'to guarantee the loyalty of supervisors to employers. Congress
also wanted to minimize any potential conflict of economic interests.4 The
members of the House and Senate Committees who approved the amendments
wanted to ensure that only employees with real authority were excluded from the
coverage of the Act. The Senate Committee Report stated that the definition of
"supervisor" had been framed with a view to assuring that "certain employees
with minor supervisory duties" be included in the Act.50  Specifically, the
committee members wanted to distinguish between "straw bosses, leadmen, set-
up men, and other minor supervisory employees, on the one hand, and the
supervisor vested with such genuine management prerogatives as the right to hire
or fire, discipline, or make effective recommendation with respect to such
action."" Congress clearly envisioned a distinction- between supervisory
employees that were essential to the management and control of the workplace
and those vested with minor supervisory authority. However, by amending the
Act and excluding supervisors, Congress did accede to the interests of manage-
ment. Congress chose to exclude supervisors from the Act and thus left them
vulnerable to employers' actions.
The Taft-Hartley amendments shielded non-profit hospitals from the
requirements of the Act until 1974. The Act was further amended by the
National Labor Relations Act Amendments of 1974 when Congress added
private, non-profit hospitals to the list of employers regulated by the Act. 2
These amendments, known as the Health Care Act Amendments, extended the
45. Id. at 490, 67 S. Ct. at 792.
46. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1988).
47. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1988); see also David P. Twomey, Labor Law and Legislation 133
(1985).
48. Hardin, supra note 16, at 1608.
49. Cox, supra note 38, at 104. See supra p. 992.
50. S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1947). The House and Senate bills defined the
term "supervisor" differently. A conference committee adopted the Senate version. H.R. Conf. Rep.
No. 510, 80th Cong.. 1st Sess. 35 (1947).
51. S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong.. Ist Sess. 4 (1947).
52. Pub. L. No. 93-360. § l(a), 88 Stat. 395 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 152(2)
(1988)).
19951
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
protections of the Act to approximately 1.5 million individuals employed by
private, non-profit hospitals. 3 .
Between the years of 1947 and 1974, state law had governed the labor rights
of non-profit hospital employees.' Congress enacted the Health Care Act
Amendments to create a uniform standard in the health care industry and to
remedy perceived problems. Congress believed that the lack of unionization at
these facilities caused low wages, poor working conditions, and a lower standard
of patient care.55  There were two main goals of the amendments. First,
Congress wanted to grant non-profit hospital employees the benefit of collective
organization. Second, Congress wanted to assure a constant supply of quality
health care.5s The 1974 amendments set the stage for a Congressional debate
on the supervisory status of all employees in the health care profession.
In 1974, when Congress amended the Act, there was much debate over the
status of many classes of employees. Both the Senate and House Committees
rejected a proposed amendment that would have explicitly excluded health care
professionals from the definition of supervisor. Congress, in rejecting the
amendment, stated, "with particular reference to health care professionals, such
as registered nurses, intern resident, fellows, and salaried physicians," the
proposed amendments were deemed not necessary in light "of existing Board
decisions."" Congress approved of the fact that '.'the Board [had] carefully
avoided applying the definition of 'supervisor' to a health care professional
whose direction of other employees [was] merely 'incidental to' the treatment of
patients."58 Also Congress expressly approved the Board's test to determine
supervisory status in the health care profession. 59 Thus, by rejecting a specific
amendment to the Act, Congress acknowledged and approved the Board's
"patient care analysis."
B. Jurisprudential Developments
Although Congress stated approval of the Board's test for classification of
nurses and other health care professionals, a split developed in the Circuit courts
concerning the proper test to determine the supervisory status of nurses. This
split eventually led to the Supreme Court's resolution of the issue in Health Care
& Retirement Corp. of America.60
53. Twomey, supra note 47, at 133.
54. Michael J. Stapp, Ten Years Later: A Legal Framework of Collective Bargaining in the
Hospital Industry, 2 Hofstra Lab. L.i. 63 (1984).
55. Twomey, supra note 47, at 133.
56. Stapp, supra note 54, at 63-64.
57. S. Rep. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 114 S. Ct. 1778 (1994).
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The Board's test was adopted by the Second Circuit in Misericordia Hospital
Medical Center v. NLRB.' The court held the appropriate test to determine the
supervisory status of a health care professional was whether "that individual, who
may give direction to other employees in the exercise of professional judgment
which is incidental to the professional's treatment of patients, also exercises
supervisory authority in the interest of the employer."62 The test used by the
Board was described as "an elusive one,"63 but the court stressed that Congress
had sanctioned this test in the Health Care Act Amendments of 1974. The
court relied on this legislative approval when citing and applying the test. The
court added that the determinations of the Board are entitled to "special
weight"65 and should be accepted so long as there exists "a reasonable basis in
law" for the decision.6
The Seventh Circuit, when faced with the same issue, emphasized not only
Congress' intent, but also the policy behind the exclusion of supervisors from
coverage under the Act. In NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc.,67 the court held seven
licensed practical nurses were employees rather than supervisors. The court
emphasized that the exclusion of supervisors from the Act was one method used
to ensure that the balance of power in the workplace did not shift entirely to the
union side. This "brake" would, for example, allow employers to use superviso-
ry personnel to replace striking workers.6 Employers may also use supervisors
to disseminate information in attempts to defeat unions during union organizing
campaigns. Furthermore, the exclusion of supervisors ensured the employer
would retain control of its workforce. The supervisors, who were in charge of
hiring, disciplining, and assigning other employees, would not be subject to the
control of the same union that represented their subordinates.
6). 623 F.2d 808 (2d Cir. 1980). In Misericordia, a head nurse who prepared a report which
criticized the hospital's operations was discharged by the director of the hospital. The hospital was
charged with committing an unfair labor practice because preparation of the report allegedly
constituted protected activity under the Act. The Hospital defended its actions by alleging that, first,
the activity (preparation of the report) was not one protected by the Act, and second, that the
discharged nurse was a supervisor rather than an employee, and thus was not protected by the Act.
Id.
62. id. at 816
63. Id.
64. See supra text accompanying notes 52-59.
65. Misericordia, 623 F.2d at 816 (citing Amalgamated Local 355 v. NLRB, 481 F.2d 996,
1000 (2d Cir. 1973)).
66. Misericordia, 623 F.2d at 816 (citing NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131,
64 S. Ct. 851, 861 (1944)).
67. 705 F.2d 1461 (7th Cir. 1983) A union won a representation election held at the nursing
home; however, management at the facility refused to bargain with the union. The Board brought
unfair labor practice proceedings against the nursing home based on the refusal to bargain and, after
a hearing, issued an order to bargain. In its defense, the nursing home alleged that the LPNs were
supervisors and therefore, could not be included in the bargaining unit, nor vote for union
representation. Id.
68. Id. at 1465.
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If supervisors were allowed to organize, the court noted, there could be
"serious conflicts of interest.'" This created a potential for divided loyalties
should the supervisor engage in concerted activity with the same employees he
was supposed to hire, fire, or lay-off. The court stated, however, that the
potential for conflict was "attenuated" if the supervisor was only responsible for
supervising or directing the employees' work.70
Supervision, the court noted, should not be defined broadly. The simple
direction of another's work is not enough to trigger the supervisory exclusion.
A supervisor must have "authority over another's job tenure and other conditions
of employment. 0v' The court adopted the Board's "patient care analysis" and
stated any discretion the nurses had was "exercised in accordance with a
professional judgment as to the best interest of the patient rather than a
managerial judgment as to the employer's best interests. 72
The policy behind the Act was also the focus of the Eighth Circuit's decision
in Waverly-Cedar Falls Health Care Center, Inc. v. NLRB.73 In Waverly, the
Board held nurses were not supervisors, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The
nurses at Waverly directed and assigned the nurses' aides, but the court
emphasized that this authority was routine. Any supervisory authority the nurses
exercised was related primarily to the care of patients and not to the business of
the employer. The court emphasized:
The determination of who is a supervisor is a fact question which calls
upon the Board's special function of applying the general provisions of
the Act to the infinite gradations of the authority within a particular
industry. Therefore the Board may exercise a large measure of
informed discretion and a court must accept its determinations so long
as they have "warrant in the record" and a reasonable basis in law.74
The Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals all adopted the
Board's bifurcated test. When faced with deciding the supervisory status of
nurses, each court examined whether the duties of the nurses furthered the
purpose of patient care or the.employer's business. If the facts indicated that
nurses exercised authority in the interest of the employer, the court held the
nurses to be supervisors. However, if the facts indicated that nurses exercised
authority only in the interest of patient care, the courts held the nurses were
69. Id. at 1466.
70. Id.
71. Id at 1465.
72. Id. at 1468.
73. 933 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 1991) In Waverly. a union filed an unfair labor practice charge
against a nursing home alleging management had violated the Act by refusing to bargain with the
union. Waverly admitted it had refused to bargain, but it maintained it was not obligated to bargain
because the LPNs employed at the facility were supervisors and, as such, did not constitute an
appropriate bargaining unit. Id.
74. Id at 629.
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employees. The Sixth Circuit, when faced with the same decision, rejected the
Board's analysis and held that licensed practical nurses were supervisors. NLRB
v. Beacon Light Christian Nursing Home75 was one of two decisions in which
the Sixth Circuit firmly rejected the Board's test.
In Beacon Light, the court evaluated the responsibility and duties of licensed
practical nurses and determined they were supervisors under the Act.76 . The
court dismissed the reasoning of the Board and stated "nurses with this kind of
responsibility are not disqualified from being supervisors simply because their
duties largely involve 'mere patient care.'0 7  Patient care, the court empha-
sized, was the business of a nursing home. If a nurse meets the statutory
definition of supervisor, she is not exempt simply because the activity being
supervised is the care of patients. The court found the legislative history of the
supervisory exception did not support the Board's reading of the statute. If
Congress had intended to provide a special exception for health care employees,
it would have amended the statute. Instead, Congress rejected such an
exception.7"
The Sixth Circuit held that the "law means exactly what it says"79 and that
the Board's test did not comport with a literal reading of the statute. The
Beacon Light court refused to allow the Board to create an exception, by means
of its test, to the statutory definition of supervisor. This refusal was a deviation
from the other Circuits and sparked a controversy that was not resolved until the
Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of
America.8
III. N.L.R.B. v. HEALTH CARE & RETIREMENT CORP. OF AMERICA
A. Board Decision
The Board issued a complaint on May 25, 1989, alleging Health Care and
Retirement Corporation of America (HRC) had committed an unfair labor
practice. The complaint alleged HRC had violated the Act by improperly
75. 825 F.2d 1076 (6th Cir. 1987).
76. In Beacon Light, an employer refused to bargain with a union. The employer alleged that
the bargaining unit was wrongly determined because twenty LPNs were included in the unit. The
employer contended the nurses were supervisors and thus excluded from the unit. The LPNs were
responsible for directing patient care and supervising and instructing nurses' aides. The LPNs
evaluated the nurses' aides and reported any infractions by the aides to management. The LPNs also
assigned patients to nurses' aides, covered unexplained absences, and suspended aides for improper
conduct. Id.
77. Beacon Light, 825 F.2d at 1079.
78. S. Rep. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974).
79. Beacon Light, 825 F.2d at 1079.
80. 114 S. Ct. 1778 (1994).
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disciplining four licensed practical nurses employed at the Heartland Nursing
Home for engaging in alleged concerted activity."
Heartland is a long-term care nursing facility. The Director of Nursing is
responsible for the nursing department. The nursing department consists of an
Assistant Director of Nursing, nine to eleven staff nurses, and fifty to fifty-five
nurses' aides.82 The staff nurses include both registered nurses and the LPNs
at issue in the case.
3
The staff nurses were the highest ranking employees at the facility after 5:00
p.m." They were responsible for the overall management and supervision of
nurse stations. The nurses were responsible for assigning work to the aides,85
ensuring adequate staffing," evaluating aides' performances, 7 reporting to
management, and resolving any disputes that arose concerning an aide. The
nurses also actively participated in the care of patients. They were responsible
for checking for any changes in a patient's health, administering medication to
patients when needed, preparing records on patient treatment, giving reports to
81. See supra pp. 987-89.
82. The nurses' aides employed at the facility were non-licensed personnel and were responsible
for providing basic care to the patients. Brief for Respondent at 8, NLRB v. Health Care*&
Retirement Corp. of Am., 114 S. Ct. 1778 (1994) (No. 92-1964). The nurses' aides had the most
frequent contact with the residents, but this work was not technical. They assisted the residents when
bathing, dressing, or grooming themselves. When on duty, the nurses' aides reported directly to the
staff nurses. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am., 306 N.L.R.B. 63, 69 (1992).
83. In order to operate 24 hours a day, the facility staffed three shifts of employees. On the
day shift, one staff nurse and six aides worked each wing, On both the evening shift and the night
shift, one staff nurse was on duty in each wing, with four aides on the evening shift and five aides
on the night shift. Brief for Respondent, supra note 82, at 8.
84. Heartland's organizational structure was hierarchical. The nursing home was headed by
an administrator. Under the administrator were several department heads who were required to report
directly to her. One of these was the Director of Nursing (DON). The DON had total responsibility
for the nursing department. Directly under the DON was the Assistant Director of Nursing (ADON),
a treatment nurse and a patient assessment nurse. Brief for Respondent, supra note 82, at 8.
85. The staff nurses assigned the nurses' aides to care for specific residents. After making the
assignments, the staff nurses had little authority in directing the performance of the nurses' aides'
work. Brief for Petitioner at 7, NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am., 114 S. Ct. 1778
(1994) (No. 92-1964). a
86. The staff nurses and the nurses' aides interacted frequently. A nurse in charge of a wing
could transfer an aide from one wing to another. The aides usually decided who would switch. A
nurse could also call an aide at home to see if she was available to replace an absent aide. A nurse
could not order an aide to report to work nor require an aide to work overtime, but the nurse did
initial time cards for aides who had worked overtime or arrived late. They also routinely reported
problems, like excessive absenteeism, to the DON or ADON. 306 N.L.R.B. at 69-70.
87. The staff nurses filled out "employee counseling forms," which were used to report
misconduct or poor job performance by an aide. These reports were sent to the administrator or the
DON and were placed in the aides' personnel files. The nurses also filled out evaluation forms. The
nurses rated the aides in several categories, but did not assign an overall rating nor did they make
any recommendations with respect to an aide's continued employment. Evaluations were conducted
after completion of an aide's probationary period and annually thereafter. Brief for Petitioner, supra
note 85, at 7.
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replacement staff on a patient's condition, and providing information about
patients to physicians and families.
The owner of the nursing home contended that the duties and responsibilities
of the licensed practical nurses made them supervisors under the Act. This
supervisory status would prevent the nurses from being afforded the protection
of the Act. The case was first heard by an administrative law judge (AU) who
resolved the issue in favor of the nurses and held that they were not supervisors
under the Act."8
According to the AU, the primary responsibility of the nurses was to
"ensure that the needs of the residents [were] met."' 9 Due to this responsibility,
the AU noted that very little of the nurses' time was spent on any activity that
could be construed as supervisory. The nature of the nurses' work suggested
employee status, but the nurses did have some authority over and responsibility
for the nurses' aides? °
The AU reviewed the responsibility of the nurses to direct the work of the
aides. He noted once a task was assigned, the nurses retained little, if any,
control over the method of completion. The nurses did have the authority to
criticize an aide for improper performance or to order an aide to repeat a task.
The nurses also issued orders to aides concerning any change in a resident's
condition. The AU found, however, that the focus of this direction was on the
"well being of the residents rather than of the employer."9' The AU adopted
the patient care analysis and distinguished between direction given other
employees to further the interests of the employer and direction given to facilitate
the care of patients. Because this work focused on patient care, the nurses did
not meet the statutory definition of supervisor.' The Board then reviewed the
case and adopted the opinion of the AL insofar as the supervisory status of the
nurses was concerned. 93
88. 306 N.L.R.B. at 63.
89. Id. at 69.
90. The AU examined the duty of the nurses to assign work to the aides and to shift aides
from wings. The nurses followed "old patterns" when assigning work and would routinely allow the
aides to decide among themselves which tasks to complete. The AU then concluded that the
assignment of tasks did not make the nurses supervisors because this duty did not require the use of
independent judgment. Id. at 69-70.
91. Id. at 70.
92. The AU additionally determined that the direction the nurses gave to the aides was similar
to the direction of employees by "leadmen" or "straw bosses." These individuals, according to the
AU, were persons Congress considered "employees." After evaluating the nurses' duties and the
statutory definition of supervisor, the AJ held that Heartland's nurses were not supervisors. Id. at
70.
93. 306 N.L.R.B. at 63. The Board stated: "The judge found, and we agree, that the
Respondent's staff nurses are employees within the meaning of the Act." Id. at 63 n.l.
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B. Sixth Circuit Decision
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,9 the one Circuit
that had consistently rejected the Board's analysis of the status of nurses, heard
the case and reversed. The court explained that its analysis was directed by the
need to draw a real distinction between a supervisor and an employee. Congress,
the court explained, realized the necessity that employers have the undivided
loyalty of employees in certain positions." Congress enabled employers to
maintain control by providing coverage to employees, while denying coverage
to supervisors. The statutory definition, emphasized the court, provides explicitly
that if an individual has any authority in any one of the listed categories, the
individual is a supervisor if the authority is exercised in the interest of the
employer.96
After announcing its test, the court acknowledged that there was a "history
of 'conflict"'97 between the courts and the Board over the supervisory status of
nurses. The conflict existed because the Board maintained nurses were not
supervisors if their actions were taken in the patients' interest.' The court
expressly rejected a distinction based on whether the action taken was in the
interest of the employer or in the interest of a patient. After reviewing the duties
of Heartland's nurses, the court concluded those duties required the use of
independent judgment and were performed in the interest of the employer.' The
court held the nurses were supervisors and were exempted from the coverage of
the Act. To reach a different result, the court stated, Congress must "carve out
an exception for the health care field."" The Board petitioned for certiorari to
the Supreme Court, and the Court granted it. In a 5-4 decision, the Court
affirmed the Sixth Circuit and thus struck down the Board's test by holding it
was inconsistent with the Act. t °°
C. Supreme Court's Decision
1. Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court, in rejecting the Board's analysis, disagreed with both
the statutory and the policy arguments offered by the Board. The opinion
emphasized that the issue presented was a "narrow question" of whether the
Board's test was rational and consistent with the Act's definition of supervi-
94. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am. v. NLRB, 987 F.2d 1256 (6th Cir. 1993).
95. Id. at 1259.
96. Id. at 1260.
97. d. at 1260.
98. Nurses, the Board argued, work for the patient rather than the employer. Id. at 1260.
99. Id. at 1261.
100. NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am., 114 S. Ct. 1778 (1994).
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sor.101 The Court noted resolution of the issue depended upon the proper
interpretation of the statutory phrase "in the interest of the employer."'
02
The Board's interpretation of the phrase was similar to an earlier approach
taken by the Board, which the Court had rejected, in NLRB v. Yeshiva Universi-
ty. In Yeshiva, the Board developed a similar bifurcated analysis to deter-
mine whether university faculty members were managerial employees exempted
from coverage under the Act. The Board distinguished between authority
exercised in the faculty's own interest and authority exercised in the interest of
the university. The Court, upon hearing the case, determined the faculty's own
professional interests could not be separated from those of the university. These
were not separate, distinct interests because the business of a university is the
education of its students. '4
The Board had consistently held that a nurse's direction of less-skilled
employees, in the exercise of judgment incidental to the treatment of patients, is
not authority exercised in the interest of the employer. The Board separated
patient care from acts taken in an employer's interest." The Court found this
was a "false dichotomy" that made "no sense.""' 6 The Court reasoned that the
residents of a nursing home were the employer's customers, and therefore,
patient care was in the interest of the employer. The Court saw no "basis for the
Board's blanket assertion that supervisory authority exercised in connection with
patient care [was] somehow not in the interest of the employer."' 0 7
The Court also reiterated language from Packard Motor, stating "[e]very
employee ... is required to act in [the employer's] interest."' '  The Board's
test was inconsistent with prior case law and would effectively render portions
of the statutory definition meaningless. The Act mandates that an employee who
uses independent judgment to engage in any one of the twelve enumerated
activities is a supervisor) °9 One of those enumerated activities is "responsible
direction of other employees."" 0 However, under the Board's test, a nurse
who used independent judgment to responsibly direct another employee would
be a supervisor only if this direction was not connected with patient care.'"
Simple direction of an employee would not be sufficient to render a nurse-
employee a supervisor under the Act. The Court refused to sanction a test that
101. 114 S. Ci. at 1780.
102. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1988).
103. 114 S. Ct. at 1782 (citing NLRB v. Yeshiva University. 444 U.S. 672, 100 S. Ct. 856
(1980)).
104. 114 S. Ct. at 1782.
105. See supra pp. 991-92.
106. 114 S. Ct. at 1782.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1782 (quoting Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 488, 67 S. C1. 789,
792 (1947)).
109. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1988).
110. Id.
I1. 114 S. Ct. at 1783.
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eliminated parts of the statutory definition." 2 The Court also dismissed the
Board's argument that since ambiguity existed in the statute, the Board should
be given broad authority to interpret the definition. ' 3 The Court found that the
statutory phrase "in the interest of the employer" was not ambiguous." 4 The
language, for example, ensured that union stewards, who adjust grievances, are
not supervisors. Furthermore, the Board's dichotomy was not acceptable in the
health care profession or in any other profession that supplied goods or services.
Equally unpersuasive were the Board's nonstatutory arguments. The Court
explained that, contrary to the Board's assertions, there did exist a danger for
divided loyalties in the health care profession. Nursing home owners implement
policies to ensure adequate patient care, and should be able to do so with the
undivided loyalty of their nursing staff. The argument that a broad reading of
the definition of supervisor would effectively nullify the inclusion of profession-.
als within the definition of "employee" in the Act was rejected. Although the
exclusion of supervisors and the inclusion of professionals does create some
tension, the tension could not be alleviated by distorting statutory language.
The Board also argued that the 1974 amendments to the Act clearly
authorized the Board's interpretation of the statute. This assertion was rejected
by the Court, stating, "[i]f Congress wishes to enact the policies of the Board,
it can do so without indirection."'" 6 The Court held that the patient care
analysis could no longer be utilized by the Board. The Court did, however,
emphasize that the decision .would have little impact outside of the health care
profession because the Board's patient care analysis test was confined to nursing
cases.
2. The Dissent
The dissent concluded that the Board's approach was rational and consistent
with the Act and thus should not be disturbed by the Court." 7 The dissenting
opinion reviewed the legislative history of the exclusion of supervisors, which
indicated that only truly supervisory personnel were intended to be excluded
from the Act's coverage. Additionally, the simultaneous inclusion of profession-
als within the definition of "employee" indicated Congress did not intend the
exclusion of supervisors to be interpreted so broadly that it would eliminate
professionals from the Act. The broad interpretation of "supervisor" would
eliminate most professionals from the Act's coverage because of the direction
most professionals exercise over other employees. Many professionals have a
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See supra p. 991.
116. 114 S. C. at 1785.
117. 114 S. Ct. at 1778 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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duty to direct subordinates, for example, "the lawyer his secretary, the teacher
his teacher's aide."" 8
The dissent noted that in formulating its test, the Board focused on the
policy behind the exclusion of supervisors. Congress' intention was to exclude
employees with real managerial authority. The Board's test for nurses reflected
this intent by distinguishing between "key managerial authority"" 9 and
direction given in connection with patient care. The Board had also applied, and
the courts had accepted, bifurcated analyses such as this in other professions. 2 '
The dissent feared a broad interpretation of "supervisor" would exempt a
large number of workers from the Act and noted the "opinion [had] implications
far beyond the nurses in this case" despite the fact that the majority alleged
otherwise.' The dissent advocated approval of the Board's test, asserting it
was one method the Board had used to ensure professionals are afforded the full
protection of the Act, while truly supervisory personnel are excluded.
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF THE. DECISION
As the Court stated, its duty in hearing the case was to decide whether the
Board's test was "rational and consistent with the Act.', 2 2  The decision
rendered by the Court, however, failed to properly apply this standard. The
Board's interpretation of "in the interest of the employer" was consistent with the
purpose and spirit of the Act and was rational in light of the policies behind the
Act.
The Act was passed to afford certain, enumerated protections to employees.
Supervisors are excluded from the Act's coverage, while professionals are
expressly included within the coverage of the Act.22 As both the majority and
the dissent note, the simultaneous inclusion of professionals and the exclusion of
supervisors creates some tension in the Act. In order to resolve this tension, the
Act must be considered as a whole. An isolated, narrow reading of the definition
of supervisor, like the one advocated by the Court, would effectively exclude
most professionals from coverage under the Act. However, the Board's analysis,
which does place some limit on the very broad statutory definition of supervisor,
carefully excluded those who actually did exercise supervisory authority from the
Act, while allowing professionals to be covered.
118. 114 S. Ct. at 1788 (quoting NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc., 705 F.2d 1461, 1465 (7th Cir. 1983)).
119. 114 S. Ct. at 1788.
120. 114 S. Ct. at 1789. For example: doctors, The Door, 297 N.L.R.B. 601 (1990); faculty
members, Detroit College of Business, 296 N.L.R.B. 318 (1989); librarians, Marymount College of
Virginia, 280 N.L.R.B. 486 (1986); pharmacists, Say-On Drugs, Inc., 243 N.L.R.B. 859 (1979).
121. 114 S. Ct. at 1792.
122. 114 S. Ct. at 1781 (quoting Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27,
107 S. Ct. 2225 (1987)).
123. See supra p. 991.
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As some courts have noted, an employee should be permitted to possess
some supervisory authority without becoming a supervisor for purposes of the
Act.'24 This is especially true in the cases where an employee is a professional
who is acting in accordance with professional norms. A classic example is an
attorney directing or issuing orders to a paralegal. In this context, it becomes
apparent that the direction, or supervision, by the attorney neither impacts, nor
adversely affects, the employer. The "responsible direction" of the attorney
could include asking the paralegal to file papers or to research a legal issue. A
strict reading of the statute would indicate that the attorney is a supervisor.
However, the purposes behind the Act weigh in favor of the attorney retaining
his status as an employee. The direction given the paralegal does not implicate
the danger of divided loyalties, nor the subversion of the employer's economic
goals. the direction given to the paralegal furthers the attorney's work, but does
not derogate from the employer's control of the workplace. A reading of the Act
as a whole, and a consideration of the spirit of the Act, demonstrates that the
Board's test delivers the best result. True supervisors, individuals who are
essentially front line management, are excluded from coverage. Professionals,
like attorneys and nurses, who incidentally direct less skilled employees would
still be covered by the Act.
The Board's test was also rational and consistent with the policies behind the
Act. To give a practical, useful meaning to the statutory definition, the policy
behind the exclusion of supervisors, and the Act as a whole, should be
considered. The majority opinion did not adequately address the policy behind
the statutory definition of supervisor, and the policy behind the Act itself.
Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act to allow employees to
organize and to bargain collectively for improved terms and conditions of
employment. The intent of Congress in passing the Wagner Act was to equalize
the balance of power in the workplace.
Congress wanted to guarantee the protections of the Act to as many
employees as possible. Congress did, however, when re-balancing power in the
Taft-Hartley Act, recognize that certain employees should be denied protection
from discrimination by the employer if they organized or engaged in concerted
activity. Because employers needed the undivided loyalty of employees with
managerial or supervisory authority, Congress exempted supervisors from the
definition of employee under the Act.
The Board's "patient care analysis" clearly reflected a balancing of these
policies. Not all nurses benefitted from the test by being found nonsupervisory.
The Board's test did ensure truly supervisory nurses would not be afforded the
protections of the Act. The "patient care analysis" was designed to extend
coverage to nurses that supervised other employees in patient care. The threat
of depriving employers of exempt supervisors was negligible. Any nurse with
124. Children's Habilitation Center, Inc. v. NLRB, 887 F.2d 130 (7th Cir. 1989); NLRB v. Res-
Care, Inc., 705 F.2d 1461 (7th Cir. 1983).
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real supervisory authority would not be covered under the Act. The Court, in
rejecting the test, failed to acknowledge that it was in line with the policies
behind the Act and the statutory exemption.
The Supreme Court emphasized that the issue decided was a narrow one and
would not extend beyond the confines of the nursing profession. The decision
does, however, create numerous problems. The broad definition of "supervisor"
adopted by the Court could easily be expanded beyond the facts of this case and
eventually seriously limit the overall effectiveness of the Act by excluding from
its coverage a large number of employees.
The Board, after the decision, is left without a workable test to determine the
supervisory status of health care employees. The Court refused to allow the
Board to continue to utilize the "patient care analysis." In so doing, the Court
circumvented the Board's attempt to be consistent with past jurisprudence in
identifying personnel who truly possess supervisory authority. Although the
Court rejected the Board's test, it did not suggest an alternative one. Unlike the
Sixth Circuit, the Court did not go as far as suggesting the only test that may be
utilized is the unembellished statutory definition.12' The Sixth Circuit test
would classify an employee as a supervisor if the employee possessed any one
of the statutory indicia.
The Court did indicate that the Board may reformulate a test that deals
specifically with nurses or other members of the health care profession, but
offered no guidance on what test would be approved by the Court. But, by not
formulating a substitute test, the Court has left the Board, and the health care
profession, in a state of flux. The future of already established bargaining units
is uncertain, and the possibility of future bargaining units including nurses is not
promising. The Board may reformulate a test, but employers and unions may be
reluctant to rely upon this test until the Supreme Court again determines its
acceptability. Until then, every employer will contend that every nurse is a
supervisor, and every union will argue that the Court did not hold that in its
decision.
The Court also severely weakened the position of the Board. The Board
formulated this test to alleviate a special problem perceived in the health care
profession. Applying expertise derived from many years of deciding such cases,
the Board resolved the problem by tailoring an exception that balanced the
competing interests-allowing nurses to organize, while protecting the economic
interests of employers in the health care industry. This decision limits the
Board's authority to formulate and implement specialized tests. Therefore, in the
future, the Board will find it difficult to fashion a test (that will pass muster with
the Court) that will bring within the coverage of the Act employees who exercise
any direction over other employees.
The Supreme Court misjudged the generic aspects of this case and the ease
with which its reasoning can be stretched to other types of employees who direct
125. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am. v. NLRB, 987 F.2d 1256 (6th Cir. 1993).
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co-employees. 126 As noted, the organization at Heartland is hierarchical. As
in most workplaces, there is an administrator, a number of middle managers, and
the rank-and-file employees. At Heartland, the person with the greatest authority
was the administrator, while the employees with the least authority were the
nurses' aides. Work orders were issued from the administrator, implemented by
the middle managers, and eventually trickled down to be performed by the
nurses' aides. Each level of employees was controlled by the next higher level.
The DON supervised the ADON, the ADON supervised the nurses, and the
nurses supervised the aides..
By eliminating the "patient care analysis," the Court has established a system
in which everyone but the lowest level of employee in a health care setting is a
supervisor. In any hierarchically structured workplace, it is conceivable every
level of employee will have some control and direction over the next level of.
employees. The Court's refusal to defer to the Board's specialized test results
in a strict, generic application of the definition of supervisor.
Because the structure of a nursing home is an organization form that is
repeated throughout the health care profession, and in many other businesses, the
language the Court used in rejecting the test could easily translate to other
professions. For example, in a typical law firm, there is a hierarchical structure
much like the structure in a nursing home or in a hospital. As discussed earlier,
an attorney in the firm, although a professional employee, could be a supervisor
because of the direction given to paralegals. But, when the example is taken one
step further, the impact of the Court's decision becomes evident. Under the
Court's broad conception of supervisor, even the paralegal achieves supervisory
status. A paralegal, who gives direction to any office staff, secretaries, runners,
or even mail room clerks, would qualify as a supervisor and would lose the
protections of the Act. This clearly does not comport with Congress' intention
of excluding only those employees with real managerial authority. The typical
paralegal has a say in neither formulating, nor implementing, the policies of the
employer. Classifying a paralegal, or any other similarly situated employee, as
a supervisor works against the purpose of the Act and severely limits the ability
of workers to organize.
V. SOLUTIONS
There are several possible solutions to the problems created by Health Care
& Retirement Corp. of America. One such solution is for the Board to exercise
its rulemaking authority. The Act gives the Board the authority "to make,
*amend, and rescind ... such rules and regulations as may be necessary.""'
The Board first exercised its rulemaking authority in the health care context. 2
126. Daily Labor Report, 1994 DLR 165 (August 29, 1994).
127. 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1988).
128. 29 C.F.R. § 103 (1988). The Board established collective bargaining units for acute care
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This authority could be utilized to create a comprehensive rule regarding LPNs
or nurses as a profession. The Board promulgates rules with the input of both
representatives of management and of labor. A rule that ensures coverage of
nurses without genuine supervisory authority should satisfy both employers and
nurses. Such a rule would also fulfill the mandates of the Act.
Although debate has raged about the propriety of the Board's rule making
authority," 9 a rule in this case would stabilize and clarify an otherwise murky
situation. Millions of people are employed in the health care profession. A
solid, well-defined rule would ensure that neither employers nor employees
would be forced to play a guessing game concerning the supervisory status of
nurses. There are advantages to the Board's rulemaking authority. Rules and
regulations promote stability by providing clear, unchanging guidelines.
Rulemaking is also advantageous because of the prospective application of the
regulations. Both employers and employees would know well in advance their
status and their obligations under the Act. However, one of the disadvantages
of rulemaking is the difficulty of formulating a workable test. The Court has the
authority to review any rules promulgated by the Board. The Court has amply
demonstrated its disfavor for any jurisprudential test that modifies the statutory
framework. A regulation issued by the Board is likely to be met with equal
disfavor.
The Board could also ensure the protection of the nurses by adjudication and
determining the status of nurses on a case-by-case basis. This would allow the
Board to carefully review the unique facts and nuances of each case and apply
the statutory indicia to each particular scenario. This type of case-by-case
analysis would allow the Board to achieve a common sense, realistic application
of the Act to the problems of the health care profession. As several courts have
noted, a reviewing court should uphold the Board's legal conclusions if it applied
the substantive law correctly.' A reviewing court should also pay substantial
deference to the Board's function of applying general provisions of the Act to
the complexities of industrial life. 13' If the courts follow this policy of
deference, the Board could conceivably remedy the problem and determine
supervisory status without formulating another test. However, .this solution
would lead to increased litigation. Each case would have to be considered and
evaluated based on its unique factual circumstances. This process could be a
long and arduous one, before any predictability was achieved, and could create
even more instability in the workplace.
hospitals. In American Hosp. Ass'n v, NLRB, I I I S. Ct. 1539 (1991). the Supreme Court affirmed
the rule promulgated by the Board.
129. Lisa A. Bireline, The Policy.Making Function of the National Labor Relations Board: The
Change from Adjudication to Rulemaking for Bargaining Unit Determinations in the Health Care
Industry, 25 Creighton L. Rev. 117 (1991).
130. See, e.g., NLRB v. Yuba Natural Resources, Inc., 824 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1987).
131. NLRB v. KDFW-TV, 790 F.2d 1273 (5th Cir. 1986).
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Alternatively, Congress could amend the statute to provide a legislative
exception to the general definition of supervisor. Congress could legislatively
overturn NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America by codifying the
"patient care analysis," and nurses, as a result, would be protected from arbitrary
classifications. The disadvantage to this solution is that the Act is generalized
to apply to a variety of employees. It has survived the dramatic changes in the
workplace because of the simplicity and generality of definitions of such terms
as "employee" and "supervisor." The advantage of a congressional amendment
is that it presents the only solution that would establish a reasonable test,
adequately accommodating competing groups, which would not be stricken down
by the Court. Congress may also use an amendment to resolve the tension
created by the exclusion of supervisors and the inclusion of professionals. If the
statute is amended for one special group, however, Congress will be flooded by
requests from other employee groups to amend the statute to protect their own
specific interests. A statutory amendment may be the only effective way,
however, to protect nurses and other similarly situated employees. As discussed
above, it will be difficult for the Board to formulate a test to distinguish between
supervisory and nonsupervisory nurses that will be upheld by the Court.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court, in rejecting the "patient care analysis," has created
numerous problems in the health care profession and potentially, even greater
problems in other professions. The Court has increased the tension that already
existed between supervisors and professionals. The Court also failed to acknowl-
edge and enforce the policies that underlie the Act. Congress' desire to extend
coverage to employees, while ensuring the loyalty of true supervisors to manage-
ment, has been thwarted. Additionally, the Court has broadened the definition
of "supervisor." As a result, many employees never before considered to be
supervisors may now be denied coverage.
There are three possible solutions to these problems created by the Court.
The Board could resolve the conflict by rulemaking or could adjudicate any
inequities on a case-by-case basis. Congress could also remedy the problem by
amending the Act to codify the Board's patient care analysis and thus provide
coverage to nurses and other similarly situated employees. The problems created.
by the decision are obvious; the best solution is much less clear.
Kathryn L Hays
1008 [Vol. 55
